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 This paper highlights the impor-
tance of institutions on development and as 
it particularly applies to Colombia. It provides 
some evidence that the institutional environ-
ment in which an economic activity takes 
place is an important determinant of growth. 
It suggests that countries with high levels of 
economic growth are characterized with by 
high levels of economic freedom and judicial 
efficiency, low levels of corruption, effective 
bureaucracy, and protected private property.
Resumen
 Este escrito destaca la importancia 
de las instituciones en el desarrollo y en la 
manera  como esto se aplica particularmente 
a Colombia. Provee alguna evidencia de que 
el ambiente institucional en el cual la activi-
dad económica ocurre es un determinante 
importante del crecimiento. Sugiere, además, 
que países con elevados índices de creci-
miento se caracterizan por altos índices de 
eficiencia judicial y libertad económica, bajos 
niveles de corrupción, una burocracia efici-
ente y protección a la propiedad privada.
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Introduction
 The institutional settings within 
which economic policies are formulated are 
of crucial importance, and the quality of these 
institutions can be a primary source of the dif-
ferences in economic growth among nations. 
Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1996) in-
dicated that the quality of economic policies 
and institutions vary from one dictatorship to 
another and from one democracy to another, 
and therefore irrespective of the type of the 
political regime will have a substantial impact 
on growth.  North (1990 and 1991) sugges-
ted that institutions shape the incentive struc-
ture that may impede or increase economic 
activity.  Poor institutions interfere with eco-
nomic growth by inducing economic agents 
to engage in redistributive politics rather 
than economic activity with lower economic 
returns (Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny 1991). 
Hall and Jones (1997) argued that poor insti-
tutions encourage diversion over production 
and therefore reduce the level of economic 
activity.  Among the relatively recent empirical 
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a theoretical research on institutions and 
economic growth are Acemoglu (2005), Ac-
emoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), 
and Aoki (2000, 2001). 
 Philip Lane and Aaron Tornell (1996) 
observed that many countries that are rich 
in natural resources such as Nigeria, Trinidad 
and Venezuela have done badly in terms of 
economic growth because natural resources 
suffer from a common-pool problem.  In the 
absence of well-defined and protected pro-
perty rights, natural resources can be exploi-
ted by a number of powerful political interest 
groups. Poor countries tend to have unre-
liable legal systems, corrupt governments and 
insecure property rights.  The lack of the se-
curity of property rights also prevents poor 
countries from acquiring the badly needed, 
advanced and expensive technology available 
in developed countries.  
 This paper highlights the importance 
of institutions and their effects on growth 
and development. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: section II addresses the 
effect of political regimes on development. 
The debate of whether the nature of political 
regime (democracy vs. dictatorship) matters 
for growth is unsettled. This section provides 
the claims and counter-claims of whether 
democracy is a pre-requisite for a country’s 
economic development. Section III underlines 
the importance of institutions, while section 
IV concludes and provides suggestions for 
further research. While the paper addresses 
these issues in a more generalized fashion, 
nevertheless, an attempt will be made to draw 
attention to the relevance of institutions for 
the future of Colombia. Section III specifically 
tries to show the political and policy impli-
cations of institutions and institutional quality 
for the betterment of Colombia.
Does the Nature of the Political 
Regime Matter? Or is it All About 
Institutions?
 Institutional scholars argue that the 
quality of institutions matter more than the 
type and the nature of the political regime. 
They suggest that the quality of institutions 
will have a lasting impact irrespective of a 
country’s political orientation. Dictatorships 
with good institutions such as Singapore, and 
Chile under Pinochet, succeeded economical-
ly while many democracies are economically 
backward.  Natural resource-rich countries 
such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo have done poorly 
in terms of economic growth while resource-
poor countries in East Asia such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea 
grew fast in the past 30 years. For example, 
South Korea had the same per capita income 
as Congo in 1960; today, it is ten times richer 
and all the indications suggest that it was all 
about the characteristics of their respective 
institutions.   
 Although the quality of institutions 
can be of utmost importance in a country’s 
economic trajectory, it might also be the case 
that the type of the political regime is also 
as important as institutions. There is a volu-
minous literature on the effect of democracy 
on growth. The overwhelming conclusion of 
this literature is that democracy and all that 
it entails is a pre-requisite for economic de-
velopment. The proposition that democracy 
promotes growth is based on the premise 
that democratic regimes provide constitu-
tional guarantees of the protection of prop-
erty rights: a legal framework that facilitates 
exchange and enforces contracts. Proponents 
of this idea suggest that democratic processes 
and the existence of fundamental civil rights 
and political freedoms create an environment 
conducive to investment, and the requisite 
incentives to undertake risky economic ac-
tivity (Scully 1988 and 1992).  The economic 
collapse of the socialist totalitarian regimes in 
the early 1990s and their shift towards demo-
cratic, free market systems support this claim.
 However, a stark contrast to this 
proposition is the conflict perspective where-
by democratic regimes are vulnerable to 
popular pressures.  Voter preferences for cur-
rent consumption over long-term investment 
make democracies ill equipped to undertake 
the kind of policies necessary for sustained 
economic growth. Pressure groups in de-
mocracies hobble the enactment of policies 
whereby current consumption activities are 
sacrificed for long-term investment. Pranab 
Abdiweli M. Ali
24
Ba	a (1993), Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993) and Weede (1983) suggest that de-
velopment-minded authoritarian regimes are 
characterized by a high degree of insulation 
from short-term, pork-barrel politics. They 
also report that the ability to insulate institu-
tions from redistributive politics allowed East 
Asian non-democratic, resource-poor coun-
tries to grow faster than comparable demo-
cratic countries.
 Dictators as residual claimants to 
national wealth may also have an encom-
passing interest in promoting economic 
growth (Olson 1991, and McGuire and Ol-
son 1996).  In addition, Dore (1978) argues 
that dictators promote growth not out of 
concern of the welfare of citizens, but to en-
hance their status among world leaders, if in 
effect personal prestige is a positive function 
of national wealth.   
 The proponents of the authorita-
rian approach to economic growth gene-
rally believe that democracy poses a real 
threat to economic development; whereas 
an insulated non-democratic regime pro-
motes growth especially during the ear-
liest stages of economic development. 
Historical evidence suggests that genuine 
democracy did not exist in any of the de-
veloped countries during several stages of 
their economic development. 1  
 Whatever cogent theoretical rea-
sons may be given in support of one perspec-
tive or another, the empirical results do not 
clarify the issue one way or the other. Eco-
nomic growth can take place in a democratic 
environment; it can also take place in a dic-
tatorship provided that economic agents are 
allowed to fully exploit their human poten-
tial. For example, a highly democratic country 
with a wide range of political freedoms and 
civil liberties may adopt economic policies 
that discourage entrepreneurship and invest-
ment. Alternatively, autocratic regimes may 
adopt economic policies that promote basic 
economic freedoms, and encourage invest-
ment and private initiatives.
1 Universal suffrage as an institutional arrangement determining the political outcome did not exist in the US. Women were not allowed to vote 
before 1920, and even then blacks were not allowed to cast their votes in some southern states.    
Good Institutions as a Pre-
requisite for a Better Colombia
 As an economist, let me start with 
a caution.  It is very likely that the transition 
of Colombia from authoritarianism, military 
junta, drug war, guerilla insurgency, to a broad-
based democracy will coincide with severe 
economic hardships. How successful Colom-
bia will be will depend on the institutions es-
tablished and the policies followed. Although 
many external factors outside the control of 
Colombian political elites will affect the out-
come, in this paper, I will emphasize those in-
stitutions and economic policies, which I think 
are under the purview of Colombia’s current 
political leaders and which I think will contrib-
ute to the consolidation of the transition and 
to good economic performance. Chief among 
these are: political freedom and civil liberty, 
economic freedom (distinct from other free-
doms), judicial efficiency and the rule of law, 
political credibility, stable economic policies, a 
transparent political system, decentralization 
of power, and an accountable and responsive 
state institutions. 
 Guaranteeing freedom, formulating 
credible and stable policies, and establishing 
transparent, decentralized, and accountable 
state institutions will determine the outcome 
of Colombia’s political and economic future. 
Colombia can therefore be the vibrant Singa-
pore in Latin America or it could be another 
economic basket case similar to its immediate 
neighbor in the East, Venezuela. The economic 
potential is there, the question is whether the 
complementary political will of unleashing 
this potential is available in the current crop 
of Colombia’s political leaders. The choice is 
theirs; it is also the Colombian people to live 
with the consequences of the choices they 
make. Here are few of the institutional vari-
ables that are deemed to be extremely im-
portant and really quite necessary for political 
and economic progress. The list is not exhaus-
tive and could not be satisfactorily addressed 
in this short paper.   
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 The rule of law in any given country 
reflects the degree to which the citizens of 
that country are willing to accept the esta-
blished institutions to make and implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes.  It also indicates 
the extent to which countries have sound 
political institutions, strong courts and or-
derly succession of powers.  A good measure 
of how reliable a country’s legal system is the 
extent to which a government enforces the 
rules codified in their constitutions. In many 
developing countries including Colombia, it 
doesn’t take much for a government to re-
pudiate its contract with the citizens of the 
country. In extreme cases, citizens face risks 
associated with arbitrary arrests, summary 
executions, outright confiscation, and forced 
nationalization of private property. Another 
burden that citizens of rogue states face is the 
poor quality of the government bureaucracy. 
Often times, the bureaucracy is incompetent 
and lacks professionalism. Moreover, the go-
vernment employees are recruited and pro-
moted not by merit but rather on political, 
tribal, or clan loyalty. In developed countries, 
the bureaucracy is not only competent and 
highly proficient, but it is also autonomous 
and free from political pressure. 
 The quality of the bureaucracy can 
be measured by the strength and expertise to 
which it conducts its activity without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in govern-
ment services. It can also be measured by the 
extent to which high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments, and the 
extent to which legal claims are adjudicated 
without paying someone for the services that 
should have been provided for free. 
Source: Transparency International
TABLE 1
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
                                                      CORRUPTION INDEX     
 Table 1 above indicates the level of 
corruption in Latin America from 1998 to 
2005. The index relates to perceptions of 
the degree of corruption as seen by busi-
ness people and country analysts and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly cor-
rupt). As the table indicates, Colombia fares 
worse than Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Peru. 
However, it fares better than its immediate 
neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador. The aver-
age score of Colombia is a paltry 3.4 out of 
a total score of 10. This means that Colom-
Countries      
Chile
Uruguay
Colombia
Brazil
Perú
Argentina
Bolivia
Ecuador
Venezuela
Paraguay
6
4.3
2.2
4
4.5
3
2.8
2.3
2.3
1.5
1998
6
4.4
2.9
4.1
4.5
3
2.5
2.4
2.6
2
1999
7
5.1
3.2
3.9
4.4
3.5
2.7
2.6
2.7
2000
7
5.1
3.8
4
4.1
3.5
2
2.3
2.8
2001
7
5.1
3.6
4
4
2.8
2.2
2.2
2.5
1.7
2002
7
5.5
3.7
3.9
3.7
2.5
2.3
2.2
2.4
1.6
2003
7ﬀ
6.2
3.8
3.9
3.5
2.5
2.2
2.4
2.3
1.9
2004
7ﬀ
5.9
4
3.7
3.5
2.8
2.5
2.5
2.3
2.1
2005
7ﬀ
5.2
3.4
3.9
4.0
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.5
1.8
Average
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bﬁa is perceived as a highly corrupt country. 
However, in relative terms, Colombia is not 
as bad as some African and Asian countries. 
The measure of corruption perception in 
Colombia has also consistently improved 
through the years. For example, in 1998 Co-
lombia was considered as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the World.  It ranked 79 
out of 85 countries in which data was avai-
lable. Only Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Hon-
duras, Paraguay, and Cameron fared worse 
than Colombia. By 2005, Colombia ranked 
56 out of a total of 158 countries in which 
data was available; 55 countries performed 
better than Colombia.
 Figures 1 & 2 below are scatter plots 
of Colombia versus Chile and Venezuela. Chile 
consistently ranked at the top while Venezuela 
consistently ranked at the bottom. However, 
there is a huge gap between Chile and Co-
lombia and there is a room for improvement 
for Colombia in the next few years. The trend 
line of Colombia is sloping upward and that 
is a good sign that finally Colombia is on the 
right path.   
FIGURE 1
CORRUPTION INDEX OF CHILE  VS COLOMBIA
FIﬂﬃ  
CORRUPTION INDEX OF COLOMBIA  VS VENEZUELA
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 The most important thing that a 
government can give to its own people is 
protect and endow them with their god-given 
freedoms. Of fundamental importance are 
political freedom and civil liberties. Whether 
a government provides political freedom to 
its citizens will depend on how it responds 
to the following questions2. Is the head of 
the state elected through free and fair elec-
tions? Are legislative representatives elected 
through free and fair elections? Are there fair 
electoral laws, fair polling and honest tabula-
tion of ballots? Do the people organize freely 
in different political parties or other political 
groupings of their choice? Is there significant 
opposition vote and realistic possibility to gain 
power through elections? Does the country 
have the right of self-determination and its 
citizens free from any kind of domination? Do 
cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority 
groups have reasonable self-determination? Is 
the political power decentralized? 
 In addition to political freedom, the 
civil liberties of the citizens should also be 
protected. Among other things, the following 
questions also address the extent to which 
citizens fully enjoy liberties of civilized so-
cieties. Is there open public and private dis-
cussion? Is there freedom of assembly and 
demonstration? Is there freedom of political 
organization? Are citizens equal under the 
law and have access to an independent, non-
discriminatory judiciary? Is there a protec-
tion from imprisonment and exile? Are there 
free and independent media, literature and 
other cultural expressions? Are there free 
trade unions and peasant organizations or 
equivalents? Are there free professional and 
other private organizations? Are there free 
businesses or cooperatives? Are there free 
religious institutions? Are there personal and 
social freedoms such as freedom of move-
ment, choice of residence, and choice of citi-
zens to engage of marriage and size of family? 
Is there equality of opportunity? And finally, is 
there a freedom from extreme government 
indifference and corruption?
 The freedom house publishes a sur-
vey of the status of the Freedom in the World. 
This is a standard-setting comparative assess-
ment of global political rights and civil liberties 
published annually since 1972. In this survey, 
countries are ranked either as free, partially 
free, or unfree.  Colombia is recently ranked 
as partially free and is also considered as one 
of the countries at the crossroads in the year 
2007. Freedom House commented:
 
 “In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe’s 
2006 reelection victory, which followed a 
constitutional change in 2005 allowing him 
to run for a second term, was approved by 
international observers as free and fair. How-
ever, later in 2006 information emerged that 
seemed to provide proof of long-rumored 
links between paramilitaries and government 
officials. Subsequent investigations discovered 
paramilitary influence in the Congress, the 
national prosecutor’s office, the military, and 
the judiciary, highlighting the threats to the 
rule of law stemming from Colombia’s ongo-
ing battle with rebel groups. These discoveries 
detracted from Uribe’s otherwise notable ef-
forts to improve security and contain paramili-
tary factions, and caused Colombia’s scores 
to fall somewhat. In order to deal with its in-
ternal conflict, the government initiated talks 
with the National Liberation Army guerrillas 
and completed the demobilization of 30,000 
members of the paramilitary known as the 
United-Self Defense Forces of Colombia. The 
demobilization occurred under the terms of 
the 2006 Justice and Peace law, which offered 
2 For a detailed explanation of the components of political freedom and civil liberty, see freedom house at http://www.freedomhouse.org.
 No country in the world without 
proper institutions, such as an unreliable legal 
system, corrupt government, and insecure 
property rights, succeeded politically and 
economically.  It is therefore imperative that 
future governments establish institutions that 
discourage banditry, and encourage the rule 
of law.  Good institutions beget good gover-
nance, and good governance is the essence 
of economic development. 
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in return for the surrender of weapons and ill-
gotten assets. Nonetheless, serious questions 
remained about the legislation’s perceived le-
niency and whether prosecutors were given 
enough time and resources to conduct ade-
quate investigations.”
 The relevant questions above na-
rrowly define freedom and did not capture 
other relevant factors measuring the degree 
of economic freedom, such as freedom to 
own and dispose private property, freedom 
to keep what one earns, and the freedom to 
exchange and trade. Therefore, it is imperative 
to define freedom more broadly to include 
economic dimensions. In the future, the Co-
lombian citizen should be given a real voice in 
public discourse including economic issues.
 Fraser Institute publishes and ranks 
countries on the level of economic freedom 
that their respective citizens enjoy3. The areas 
and the components of the economic free-
dom index included in this survey are shown 
below in Table 2.  
3 For more information on economic freedom, visit http://www.freetheworld.com.
TABLE 2
THE AREAS AND COMPONENTS OF THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD INDEX
 Table 3 below presents the eco-
nomic freedom index for most of the Latin 
American countries. The index is scored in the 
scale of 1-10; the higher the index the higher 
the level of economic freedom. As shown in 
Table 3, Colombia scored second to last, only 
Venezuela fared worse than Colombia. While 
Colombia started with a medium level of eco-
nomic freedom scoring 5 out of 10 in 1975, it 
scored 5.55 in 2006, a negligible improvement 
over 30 years.  Relatively Chile scored 3.9 in 
1975, much lower than Colombia; however, by 
2005 it doubled its level of economic freedom 
to a respectable score of 7.98.  
 Figures 3 and 4 below compares Co-
lombia’s level of economic freedom to those 
of Chile and Venezuela; of particular interest here 
is the recent trend of Chile and Venezuela. While 
Chile started low and consistently moved up 
in the ladder of economic freedom, Venezue-
la started with an acceptable level of eco-
nomic freedom in 1975 and since then took 
a downhill turn. It is obvious here that Chile 
could be a role model for Colombia while it 
is Colombia’s best interest to avoid the road 
that Venezuela treaded on recently. 
13 4589 :; <:=9>?@9?C3 Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises
A. General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption.
B.  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP.
C. Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP.
D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies).
i. Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies)
ii. Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies)
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A.  Taxes on international trade.
i. Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports.
ii. Mean tariff rate.
iii. Standard deviation of tariff rates.
B.   Regulatory trade barriers.
i. Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas.
ii. Costs of importing: the combined effect of import tariffs, license fees, bank fees, and 
the time required for administrative red-tape raises costs of importing  equipment by 
(10 = 10% or less; 0 = more than 50%).
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size.
D. Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate.
E. International capital market controls
i. Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital 
markets. 
ii. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with  
foreigners—index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories.
N3OPP9QQ C: 4:R?G S:?9M
A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average an-
nual growth of real GDP in the last ten years
B. Standard inflation variability in the last five years. 
C. Recent inflation rate.
D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad.
T
3
U
9
V
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A. Judicial independence: the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by 
the government or parties in disputes.
B. Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge 
the legality of government actions or regulation.
C. Protection of intellectual property.
D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process.
E. Integrity of the legal system.
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A. Credit Market Regulations
i. Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks.
ii. Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks.
iii. Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector. 
iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates.
v. Interest rate controls: interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely 
determined by the market.
B. Labor Market Regulations
i. Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages 
because it is too low or not obeyed.
ii. Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by 
private contract.
iii. Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining.
iv. Unemployment Benefits: the unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work.
v. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel
C. Business Regulations
i. Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices.
ii. Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures are an impor-
tant obstacle to starting a new business.
iii. Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a substantial amount of 
time dealing with government bureaucracy.
iv. Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy.
v. Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with import and export 
permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan 
applications are very rare.
TABLE 3
ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX FOR SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Countries           
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana
Paraguay
Perú
Trinidad & Tob.
Uruguay
Venezuela
ﬀ
`

4.52
3.91
5
4.96
4.05
4.88
5.8
1975

`

4.2
5.56
4.77
5.32
5.69
4.03
5.09
5.82
6.31
1980
ﬀ6
3.7
6.16
5.16
4.5
5.11
3.08
4.98
5.88
5.98
1985

4.47
6.93
4.94
5.27
5.6
4.16
5.79
6.12
5.35
1990
66
4.47
7.48
5.45
5.97
4.68
6.46
6.32
6.85
6.1
4.26
1995
7
c

5.99
7.28
5.28
5.69
6.08
6.21
7.06
7.34
6.95
5.51
2000
6
5.93
7.47
5.46
5.47
6.02
6.3
7.02
7.17
6.76
5.49
2001
6
6.08
7.45
5.33
5.86
5.83
6.14
7.01
7.01
6.83
4.44
2002

5.29
6.73
5.28
5.33
5.68
6.01
5.79
6.40
6.53
5.19
Average
7ﬀ
5.95
7.61
5.45
5.8
5.8
6.18
7
6.87
6.75
3.99
2003
6
5.89
7.62
5.46
5.22
5.59
6.08
6.98
6.94
6.9
4.46
2004
6
`
6.03
7.93
5.44
5.59
5.8
6.17
6.87
6.92
6.91
4.56
2005
7
`
6.15
7.98
5.55
5.62
5.61
6.16
6.95
6.96
6.86
4.48
2006
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ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX OF COLOMBIA VS CHILE
 
FIﬂﬃ e
ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX OF COLOMBIA VS VENEZUELA 
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 Another important factor that will 
affect the success of a country’s future state 
is the quality of the government’s economic 
policies. Fiscal, monetary, and trade policies 
will affect the economic environment in 
which economic activity takes place. One of 
the fiscal policy parameters that are consi-
dered to have a negative impact on eco-
nomic growth is the size of government. 
The standard explanation in the literature 
is that government deficit crowd-out pri-
vate capital formation by increasing inter-
est rate and reducing the amount of sav-
ings avai-lable for private investors.  To the 
extent that deficits are used for investment 
purposes, the country’s total capital forma-
tion might not necessarily decline. How-
ever, the relative productivity of public and 
private capital can affect the pace of eco-
nomic growth and as long as the return to 
public capital is below that of private capi-
tal, deficits will negatively affect the growth 
rate of the country’s economy.  It is there-
fore necessary to have a small but efficient 
government. This will minimize the habit of 
depen-ding the government for things that 
people can do for themselves.  If you create 
a government big enough to give you every-
thing you need, it would be a government big 
enough to take everything you have.  The 
future governments of Colombia shouldn’t 
fall into the trap that the size of your bu-
reaucracy is a reflection of your power.  
 How about trade policy? The Co-
lombian economy should be open and should 
follow an outward-looking strategy. Open-
ness is an important determinant of eco-
nomic growth. The current US government 
and the US congressional leaders concluded 
a bipartisan agreement that provided a clear 
path for advancing free trade agreements, 
including the agreement with Colombia. The 
agreement includes strong labor and environ-
mental provisions which are necessary for 
the Colombian workers. Colombia should 
capitalize on this agreement and should be 
fully engaged in international trade. 
 The future Colombian regimes 
should work hard to seek broad and diverse 
markets for their export goods including 
plantains, sugar crops, petroleum, coal, coffee, 
and the other natural resources to eliminate 
the foreign exchange bottleneck of depen-
ding exports to US for their livelihood.  With 
the recent improvement of security, Colom-
bia can also develop its tourist industry. The 
empirical literature on trade overwhelmingly 
suggest that trading with other nations is a 
positive-sum game; is mutually beneficial to 
the trading partners; and is an engine of eco-
nomic growth and development. 
 In terms of monetary policy, the most 
important thing that the Colombian govern-
ment should do is to protect the value of the 
Colombian peso.  Inflation has been declining 
since 2004 and is a good indication that the 
government is on the right track. The recent 
inflow of export dollars has resulted in subs-
tantial reevaluation of the Colombian peso. 
However, Colombia should strike a balance 
between keeping the value of the peso and 
the effect that an overvalued currency could 
have on its trade balance. 
4. Credibility and Transparency
 The future Colombian governments 
should be credible and transparent. Credibility 
can be provided not by decree but by enforc-
ing the law of the land and abiding by it.  In 
other words, you earn credibility when the 
government enforces the rules and is bound 
by them. Having free elections and winning it 
does not guarantee credibility. You have to earn 
it and the biggest obstacle to political credibil-
ity is an executive with excessive discretionary 
powers. Therefore, the government should be 
frugal with its discretionary powers.  
 The government should also be 
transparent, and to be transparent it should 
allow the full freedom of the press and the 
mass media.  Transparency allows the govern-
ment to sustain its political future.  It will allow 
the government to build a power base not 
based on clients and individuals but on grass 
root support. Freedom and good economic 
policies coupled with transparency and politi-
cal credibility will guarantee a political success 
and acceptance from the masses.
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 It is imperative that the power of the 
state is divided and should not be concen-
trated in the hands of one individual or one 
entity.  In addition to horizontal separation of 
powers, the power of the state should also be 
vertically divided.  The idea of decentralization 
is to establish different hierarchical levels and 
to distribute the power of the state in a way 
that creates mutual dependence. By sharing 
the legislative and enforcement powers with 
lower levels of government, decentralization 
will also reduce the pressure on the govern-
ment to deliver and will allow it to deflect 
criticism. By decentralizing, you are not only 
sharing the power with lower level groups 
but also the responsibility and the blame that 
comes with it.  Although Colombia has a long 
history of constitutional governments, the 
concentration of the political and economic 
power in the hands of the elite minority fuels 
insurgency and the continent’s longest-run-
ning armed conflict.
 In a paper co-authored with Hodan 
Isse and published in Cato Journal, we found 
that the decentralization of power reduces 
corruption. The paper addressed the deter-
minants of economic corruption in a cross-
sectional study of 119 countries. It found that 
decentralization and vertical separation of 
powers reduces corruption and creates mul-
tiple veto powers along vertically competing 
jurisdictions. It makes collusion among co-
rrupt officials difficult to enforce.  
 Although some commentators and 
political science scholars might argue that 
federalism and decentralization of power 
would perpetuate regionalism, all the indica-
tions suggest that the vertical separation of 
powers protects the sovereignty of the in-
dividual and protects individual liberty from 
self-serving politicians who might otherwise 
seek the concentration of the political power 
and would use it to attain pecuniary and non-
pecuniary personal and parochial gains.  
6. Conclusion
 Many empirical results from different 
countries reveal that countries with high le-
vels of economic growth are characterized by 
high levels of judicial efficiency, low levels of 
corruption, effective bureaucracy, sound eco-
nomic policies, transparent and decentralized 
political system, and protected private pro-
perty, among others. The results also indicate 
that freedom is important for economic de-
velopment. Economic and political freedoms 
are symptomatic of good institutions. They 
go hand in hand, suggesting that freedom can 
only be sustained in an environment of high 
institutional quality. Today, Colombia under 
President Uribe has a window of opportu-
nity to put the future path of Colombia into a 
good start.  Let the journey begin with institu-
tional framework that will guarantee the so-
vereignty of the Colombian citizen, and I hope 
the transition to a solid democracy will soon 
generate substantive economic outcomes for 
the people of Colombia.  The next genera-
tion of Colombian leaders will learn from the 
mistakes of their predecessors and will offer 
the people of Colombia real opportunities to 
improve their material and moral well-being.
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